US20120249326A1 - Transportation security system and associated methods - Google Patents
Transportation security system and associated methods Download PDFInfo
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- US20120249326A1 US20120249326A1 US13/444,690 US201213444690A US2012249326A1 US 20120249326 A1 US20120249326 A1 US 20120249326A1 US 201213444690 A US201213444690 A US 201213444690A US 2012249326 A1 US2012249326 A1 US 2012249326A1
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- container
- csd
- sensor
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- microcontroller
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
- G08B25/009—Signalling of the alarm condition to a substation whose identity is signalled to a central station, e.g. relaying alarm signals in order to extend communication range
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
- G06Q10/08—Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading or distribution; Inventory or stock management
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B21/00—Alarms responsive to a single specified undesired or abnormal condition and not otherwise provided for
- G08B21/02—Alarms for ensuring the safety of persons
- G08B21/0202—Child monitoring systems using a transmitter-receiver system carried by the parent and the child
- G08B21/0269—System arrangements wherein the object is to detect the exact location of child or item using a navigation satellite system, e.g. GPS
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
- G08B25/01—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems characterised by the transmission medium
- G08B25/08—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems characterised by the transmission medium using communication transmission lines
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
- G08B25/01—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems characterised by the transmission medium
- G08B25/10—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems characterised by the transmission medium using wireless transmission systems
Definitions
- Cargo loss due to theft has become a serious problem. Cargo is often misappropriated by shipping company employees, cargo handlers, and/or security-personnel. Many insurance professionals believe that more than half of all major cargo thefts are planned in logistics departments, by employees at the shipper or manufacturer who are thought to be trustworthy. Certain authorities believe that gangs operating in many metropolitan areas are actually training some of their members in logistics so that they will be eligible for employment at desirable trucking, warehousing or forwarding firms.
- Shipping containers may also be used by terrorists for the arms shipments. Of greatest concern is the shipment of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. Some of these materials are relatively small in size and could be hidden in shipping containers without being detected by governmental authorities. If such weapons were to fall into the wrong hands the results could be devastating.
- a locking mechanism or security seal are applied to-container doors, to seal the cargo within the container.
- anyone who possesses the key or the combination, whether authorized or not, may gain access to the interior of a container.
- the locks can be easily picked or removed by-other means.
- locking devices are a limited deterrent to thieves or terrorists.
- an electronic seal (“e-seal”) may be applied to a container.
- e-seals are similar to traditional door seals and applied to the containers via the same, albeit weak, door hasp mechanism.
- These e-seals include an electronic device, such as a radio or radio reflective device that can transmit the e-seal's serial number and a signal if the e-seal is cut or broken after installation.
- the e-seal does not communicate with the interior or contents of the container and does not transmit information related to the interior or contents to other devices.
- the e-seal typically employs either a low power radio transceiver or uses radio frequency backscatter techniques to convey information from an e-seal to a reader installed at, for example, a terminal gate.
- the radio frequency backscatter technique involves use of a relatively expensive, narrow band, high-power radio technology based on a combination of radar and radiobroadcast technologies.
- the radio frequency backscatter technology requires that a reader send a radio signal of relatively high transmitted power (i.e., 0.5-3 W) that is reflected or scattered back to the reader with modulated or encoded data from the e-seal.
- the e-seals are not effective at monitoring security of the container. For example, other methods of intrusion into the container may occur (e.g. breaching other parts of the container such as the side walls). Further, a biological agent may be implanted into the container through the container's standard air vents.
- Present worldwide transportation security system provides cost effective and reliable system of and method for: (1) registering any event in connection with breach of any wall in a container; (2) detecting an opening, a closing and a removal of the container's doors; (3) monitoring the condition of all seals and locks on the container; (4) monitoring a cargo conditions inside the container; (5) detecting human or an animal inside the container; (6) monitoring the container's movement; (7) detecting weapons of mass destruction in the container; (8) registration of movement inside the container; (9) measuring cargo weight inside the container; (10) registering environmental parameters inside the container (temperature, humidity, smoke . . . etc.); and (11) simultaneously providing means for tracking movements of the container for reasons of security and logistic efficiency.
- the integrity system may generate false alarms with the probability equal to or better than of 10 ⁇ 5 :10 ⁇ 6 .
- the transportation security system provides intermodal threat identification, detection, and notification transportation security system.
- the transportation security system may be applied to all transpiration modalities including air, rail, truck, ship, barge and bus transport modes.
- the instant security system provides inexpensive means to monitoring each shipping container. Container tempering may be detected and reported rapidly.
- present transportation security system could be a credible defense mechanism against terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons, weapons materials, and/or terrorist personnel by preventing unauthorized access to shipping containers. The threat of cargo theft or piracy is also mitigated.
- present transportation security system provides governmental and law enforcement agencies with the means to respond, in real-time, to cargo theft, piracy, and/or terrorist attacks.
- the system includes a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at least one shipping container the CSD monitors a cargo inside the container and detects intrusion the container.
- the CSD includes at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device.
- the microcontroller generates an alert status based on an output signals from at least one sensor.
- the output signals may be subjected to an individual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing procedure.
- the integrated sensor processing procedure makes a decision of the container alert status based on the output status of the at least one sensor.
- a Network Operations Center (NOC) includes a NOC communications facility configured to communicate with at least one telecommunication network. The NOC being configured to receive data from one or more CSDs.
- the NOC includes a data storage medium configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the container events.
- the present application includes a transportation security system for monitoring a plurality of shipping containers being transported by a plurality of cargo transport vehicles.
- Each of the plurality of cargo vehicles transports at least one shipping container.
- the system includes a CSD removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection of intrusion violations.
- the CSD includes at least one sensor.
- the CSD also includes a microcontroller and communication device.
- the system may also include a plurality of bridges. Each bridge of the plurality of bridges may be disposed in one cargo transport vehicle.
- Each bridge may include a communication system being configured to communicate with the CSDs and a NOC.
- the bridge may also include a data storage medium configured to store data pertaining to container events.
- a NOC communicates with each of the plurality of bridges and CSDs.
- the NOC may receive data from one or more of the plurality of bridges and CSDs.
- the NOC includes a data storage medium configured to store one or
- the present application includes a method for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle.
- the method includes providing a CSD configured to be removably coupled to the at least one shipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detecting intrusion violations.
- the CSD includes at least one sensor.
- the CSD includes a microcontroller and a CSD communications device.
- the method may also include sending output data obtained from at least one sensor to the microcontroller.
- the present application includes a method for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a destination point.
- the method includes providing route data corresponding to the path traversed by at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a destination point.
- An actual position of at least one cargo vehicle is monitored to determine whether the actual position of the vehicle corresponds to the route data.
- An alert status condition is generated when the actual position of the vehicle does not correspond to the route data.
- a NOC is notified of the alert status.
- the present application includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing data transmitted between a CSD and a bridge.
- the CSD being removably coupled to at least one shipping container disposed on a cargo transport vehicle.
- the bridge is disposed on the cargo transport vehicle.
- the data structure includes: a container CSD identification field containing data that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containing either CSD status data or bridge command data depending on a course of the packet.
- the present application includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing data being transmitted between a bridge and a NOC.
- the bridge being configured to monitor at least one container CSD configured to be removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container disposed on a cargo transport vehicle.
- the bridge being disposed on the cargo transport vehicle.
- the data structure includes: a bridge identification field containing data that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containing either bridge-status or the NOC command data depending on the source of the packet.
- the present application includes a personal conditions monitoring system.
- the system includes a monitoring module.
- the monitoring module includes sensor array and ADC.
- the system includes a communication subsystem and a power subsystem with replaceable batteries.
- the communication subsystem includes transceiver and antenna.
- FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the transportation security system depicted in FIG. 1 .
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a Container Security Device (CSD).
- CSD Container Security Device
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a smoke detector.
- FIG. 9 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor.
- FIG. 10 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor.
- FIG. 11 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a door-opening sensor.
- FIG. 12 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone.
- FIG. 13 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a UMPR.
- FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters for measuring a digital signature.
- FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted in FIG. 15 when the container is steady.
- FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted in FIG. 15 when the container is moving.
- FIG. 18 shows a block diagram of one exemplary bridge.
- FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of the bridge, depicted in FIG. 18 , when stationary.
- FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary portative bridge depicted in FIG. 18 .
- FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary service bridge depicted in FIG. 18 .
- FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary Network Operations Center depicted in FIG. 1 .
- FIG. 23 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC server depicted in FIG. 22 .
- FIG. 24 shows a flowchart showing one exemplary method for monitoring container integrity.
- FIG. 25 shows a diagramed depiction of personal conditions monitoring system.
- FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system 100 in accordance with one embodiment.
- Each mode of transportation e.g., transportation by ship
- a ship 110 is illustratively shown carrying a plurality of shipping containers 130 .
- Each shipping container 130 has a Container Security Device (“CSD”) 140 that communicates with a Network Operations Center (“NOC”) 170 , preferably via a Bridge 150 .
- NOC Network Operations Center
- the CSD 140 detects a break-in violation, an alert status is generated and transmitted to NOC 170 , via the Bridge 150 .
- the CSD 140 communicates with the Bridge 150 using an Unlicensed International Frequency Band Local Area Communication Network 160 C.
- the CSD 140 may communicate with the NOC 170 via a cellular communications channel 160 A or a satellite communication channel 160 B.
- the alert status generated by the CSD 140 when onboard a ship for example, includes the identity of the container 130 , in which also is located, the location of the ship 110 , the time and date of the alert status generation, and a description of the alert status.
- the NOC 170 upon receipt of the alert status, may either confirm or reject the alert status. If the alert status is confirmed, the NOC 170 may generate an alarm signal.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram further illustrating the transportation security system 100 of FIG. 1 .
- FIG. 2 illustratively shows communication between CSD 140 , NOC 170 and Bridge 150 in further detail.
- the CSD 140 is shown communicating with the NOC 170 via cellular 160 A or satellite 160 B communications.
- the Bridge 150 is also shown communicate with the NOC 170 via cellular 160 A or satellite 160 B connection.
- the Bridge 150 may also communicate with the NOC 170 via an Ethernet connection 160 D, for example.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrates one exemplary CSD 300 .
- CSD 300 may, for example, represent CSD 140 of FIG. 1 .
- the CSD 300 includes a Sensor Block 310 , a local alert mechanism 320 , a Microcontroller 330 , a GPS receiver 340 , a Cellular Modem 350 A, a Satellite Modem 350 B, a wireless LAN (WLAN) Interface 350 C, an Antenna Block 360 and a Power Unit 370 .
- the WLAN Interface 350 C uses one of the standard type Unlicensed International Frequency transceiver like Bluetooth Zigbee etc.
- the Sensor Block 310 is illustratively shown with a Light Sensor 310 A, a Capacity Proximity Sensor 310 B, an Accelerometer 310 C, a Micro Power Radar (MPR) 310 D, an Inductive Sensor 310 E, a RFID reader 310 F, a Strain Gage 310 G.
- the Sensor Block 310 may also include one or more of: a Piezosensor 310 H, an Ultrasonic Sensor 3101 , a Microphone 310 P, an Ultrasound Micropower Radar (UMPR) 310 J, an Infrared Sensor 310 K, a Door Opening Sensor 310 L, a Seal Break Sensor 310 M, a Sensor control parameters of surrounding 310 N, as shown in FIG. 4 .
- Sensor control parameters of surroundings 310 N may include one or more of: a Temperature Sensor, a Smoke Detector Sensor, a Humidity Sensor, etc.
- the Antenna block 360 includes a GPS antenna 360 A, a Cellular antenna 360 B, a Satellite antenna 360 C, and a low power LAN antenna 360 D.
- microcontroller 330 monitors output of sensor block 310 to determine an alert status. If an alert status is determined, microcontroller 330 may provide Cellular modem 350 A, Satellite modem 350 B and/or LAN interface 350 C with a formatted message packet. This message packet may, for example, be transmitted from the Antenna block 360 to either the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170 . Transmission message packets from the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 (see FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 ) are received by the Antenna block 360 and directed to one or more of the Cellular modem 350 A, the Satellite modem 350 B and the LAN interface 350 C. Microcontroller 330 may then process the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 message packet to receive information and/or instructions from the NOC 170 , for example.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 399 for detecting and registering container intrusion signals (e.g., alert statuses).
- Microphone 310 P output signals are monitored by the microcontroller 330 , which thus identifies sensors 310 that exceed one or more pre-set threshold levels.
- the microcontroller 330 operates in a calibration mode.
- the container's 130 walls may be struck several time and ‘images’ of these hits may be recorded and stored in a pulling library of images 425 in the microcontroller 330 for use as calibration images pertaining to this particular container 130 .
- one or more exemplary images of intrusion or damage to the container 130 may also be stored in the library of images 425 .
- the microcontroller 330 identifies signals that exceed certain threshold levels. These signals may be separated by microcontroller 330 , in Step 400 , into a single hit signal 405 and/or a series of hit signals 407 . Within the microcontroller 330 , a Short Time Fast Fourier Analysis is used to process the single hit signal 405 , in Step 410 , and a Wavelet analysis may also be performed, in Step 415 . An image of the single hit signal is then created. Correlation Functions in Step 420 and Theory of Sample Recognition in Step 430 are utilized to compare the hit image to the exemplary images stored within the library of images 425 . If the microcontroller 330 determines that the single hit image correlates with to the images of intrusion into a damaged container, a majority voting algorithm is applied to the single hit image. The majority voting algorithm is a part of an integrated sensor processing procedure 470 .
- the majority voting algorithm is based on major voting mark of unrelated criteria. Each criterion may be assigned positive and/or negative points.
- the majority voting algorithm is applied to the image of the single hit signal the decision about intrusion attempt is based on voting process based on sum of all points given during processing of the hit signal image. If the sum of total points given to the hit signal image indicates that an intrusion attempt took place, the single hit image is further subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 , which makes a decision as to if intrusion occurred.
- the majority voting algorithm may also be applied to the series of hit signals 407 in Step 470 . If the sum of total points given during processing of the series of hit signals 407 indicates that intrusion, or even an intrusion attempt, occurred, the series of hit signals 407 are subjected to an integrated sensor processing procedure 470 which makes a decision as to if the intrusion occurred.
- the data processed by integrated sensor processing procedure 470 is incomplete or inconsistent, this data is sent by the CSD 140 to the NOC 170 for a further analysis. In this case the NOC 170 (i.e., not the CSD 140 ) will make the decision as to if intrusion occurred.
- the microcontroller 330 may also utilize correlation functions 420 to compare output from the Accelerometer 310 C and other sensors like the Piezosensor 310 H and/or the Ultrasonic sensor 3101 to an exemplary image that corresponds to a signal generating by a metal cutting instrument, for example, stored in the library of images 425 . If, in Step 420 , the microcontroller 330 determines that the intrusion signal 420 correlates to the stored signal image generated by a metal cutting instrument 425 , the intrusion signal is then further subjected to an integrated sensor processing procedure 470 that makes a decision as to if the intrusion took place.
- Output signals from the accelerometer 310 C may also be monitored by microcontroller 330 to detect vibration of the container wall.
- the microcontroller 330 may process, in step 403 , the vibration signal 402 to produce a wavelet analysis and a “window” Fourier analysis for comparison, in step 440 , to one or more recorded images of library of images 425 to determine which mode of transportation is used to move the container 130 .
- the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 may then be applied to these signals to determine the mode of transport or if an intrusion took place.
- An output signal from the light sensor's 310 A may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to determine intrusion or fire. For example, if the microcontroller 330 determines that the output signal indicates that the measured light within the container exceeds a certain rate of change threshold, the microcontroller 330 may initiate further analysis of the output signal, and/or other sensor signals, to determine if an intrusion is occurring, and/or if there is presence of smoke: If the microcontroller 330 determines that an intrusion has occurred and/or smoke is present, the output signal may be subjected to further processing by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make the decision that intrusion occurred or not.
- Output signals from the capacitive proximity sensor's 310 B, Strain gage 310 G and RFID reader 310 F outputs also may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect addition or removal of objects from the container 130 .
- the output signals may, for example, be analyzed by the microcontroller 330 , Step 445 , to detect change in the cargo mass. If change in cargo mass is detected, the capacitive proximity sensor output may be subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 which makes a decision about the alert status of the container 130 .
- An output signal from the capacitive proximity's sensor 310 B may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to determine if any objects are in close proximity to locks and seals of the container 130 . If any objects are detected in close proximity to the locks and the seals of the container 130 , the output signals from one or more sensors may be further analyzed within the microcontroller 330 to determine if a break-in has occurred. If a break-in is detected by the microcontroller 330 , further analysis of these signals may be made by the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- Output signals from sensors are monitored by the microcontroller 330 in control parameters of surrounding 310 N.
- These sensors may, for example, include a temperature sensor that produces an output signal which may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect thermal excursions outside one or more predetermined temperature ranges and/or to detect rates of change in temperature that occur outside one or more predefined rates of change. If, for example, the microcontroller 330 determines that the sensed temperature is outside predetermined temperature ranges and/or that the rate of temperature change if outside these predetermined limits, output signals from one or more sensors will be further analyzed by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to decide if an intrusion occurred.
- an output signal from the smoke detector sensor may be monitored to determine if chemicals are present within the air, and/or air clarity inside the container 130 exceeds a predefined threshold level. If, for example, a chemical is detected within the air, output signals from one or more sensors will be further analyzed by the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make decision as to the container 130 alert status.
- an output signal from the UMPR 310 J may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect presence of humans or animals within the container 130 . If, for example, presence of humans and/or animals is detected, the output signals from one or more sensors may be further processed by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- the UMPR 310 J may, for example, utilize the Doppler's effect to detect movement inside the container 130 .
- the UMPR 310 J may, for example include an ultrasonic transceiver. This sensor may also be used to detect force entry attempts into the container 130 , based upon registration of impact drilling, gas-cutting, etc., by utilization of the UMPR 310 J as a highly sensitive UMPR-based microphone.
- the later purpose is accomplished by applying a procedure to determine, in Step 460 , the integrity of the container's wall. If the UMPR 310 J output data exceeds the threshold determined in Steps 460 and 465 , application of a procedure to determine the integrity of the walls and the cargo movement inside the container 130 may be applied. The output data of one or more sensors may then be further analyzed within the microcontroller 330 for presence of humans/animals or presence of wall integrity failure. If, for example, presence of humans/animals and/or wall destruction are detected, the output signals from one or more sensors 310 are subjected to the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- Output signals from sensor MPR 310 D may be processed to produce a radioprint (e.g., radio-imprint) based upon locations of the objects inside the container 130 .
- a radioprint e.g., radio-imprint
- This radioprint may be monitored by microcontroller 330 to detect deviations in object location, by comparing the radioprint to an initial radio print recorded during calibration, for example. Radioprints are built based on the analysis of all reflected signals, including signals reflected by objects that are not located in the direct field of the sensor. If, for example, microcontroller 330 detects deviation between a current radioprint and the radioprint recorded during calibration, the radioprints and output signals from other sensors may be subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to determine if an intrusion occurred.
- Output signals from the infrared sensor's 310 K may be monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect warm objects within the container. If, for example, the microcontroller 330 detects a warm object, the output signal from one or more sensors may be further analyzed, in Step 465 , within the microcontroller 330 to determine the presence of humans or animals by applying procedures that determines movement inside the container 130 . If, for example, humans or animals are detected, output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integrated procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- An output signal from the GPS receiver 340 may be monitored to determine a location of the CSD 140 , and further to determine if this location differs from a programmed route for the container 130 . If, for example, the microcontroller 330 determines that the current location differs from the programmed route, the output signal may be further analyzed, in Step 435 , to determine deviation from the programmed route. If, for example, significant deviation from the programmed route is detected, the output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- the door opening sensor 310 L and the seal break sensor 310 M are monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect changes in integrity of the doors and seals of the container 130 . If the microcontroller 330 detects changes in integrity, the output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.
- FIG. 5 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer.
- accelerometer indications are monitored in two modes: Standby and Active.
- Standby mode accelerometers are being checked in equal time periods, with frequency FI about 100 Hz in, instead of constant monitoring. Sensors go offline between checkpoints, and module's microcontroller, if not being used, enters sleep mode.
- accelerometers remain online from the moment of mode entry show in Step 508 to the moment when D remains below PI threshold shown in Step 513 for N measurement cycles as show in Steps 514 and 515 , when S (number of cycle when D less then P 1 ) exceeds N, then this in itself is the condition for exiting the Active mode as shown in Step 516 , then accelerometers 301 C are turned off. D is measured and determined in each measurement cycle shown in Step 510 and Step 511 and its maximum value maxD is recorded as shown in Step 509 . MaxD is verified upon exiting the Active mode.
- Step 517 If the value MaxD exceeds P 2 threshold as shown in Step 517 , the majority algorithm of the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 indicates an impact against container's structure and time and amplitude of hit have fixed value as shown in Step 518 . If, however, the value MaxD does not exceed the threshold P 2 microcontroller returns into the Standby mode as shown in Step 519 .
- FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor.
- the algorithm is used to determine breaking in the container by changed light intensity inside the container as the result of both penetration of outside light and light flashes occurring in metal cutting tools operation.
- the light sensor's 310 A indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 3 Hz as show in Step 601 .
- Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated as shown in Step 602 .
- Filtered signal A F is compared in two stages with original sensor readings. If A F exceeds A* by more than 2% as show in Step 603 , the integrated sensor procedure 470 reports potential breaking in the container as show in Step 609 . If A F exceeds A* by more than 5% as shown in Step 604 , the integrated sensor procedure 470 reports the break in the container 130 as shown in Step 605 .
- Step 604 the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports high chance of breaking in the container as show in Step 609 .
- Light sensor is recalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring as show in Steps 606 , 607 , 608 and 610 . Recalibration is required because containers are not hermetically sealed, due to which light intensity inside of them could change in changing outside light conditions (at day/night).
- FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage.
- the algorithm is used to record damage (alterations) to container structure.
- the strain gage 310 G is queued with frequency about 1 kHz in 15 ms-long sessions shown in Step 701 .
- Vector of measured results A ⁇ 15> is median filtered as shown in Step 702 .
- Measurement sessions occur with frequency about 3 Hz.
- Filtered signal A F is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If A F exceeds A * by more than 1% as show in Step 703 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential damage to container structure as shown in Step 707 . If A F exceeds A * by more than 3% as shown in Step 704 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports the break in the container 130 as shown in Step 708 .
- Step 704 the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential damage to container structure as shown in Step 707 .
- Strain gage is recalibrated hourly in the process of its monitoring as shown in Steps 705 , 706 , 709 and 710 . This is required because changing ambient temperature (at day/night) causes strain of metal container walls.
- FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion by s smoke detector sensor.
- the algorithm is used to determine smoke content in the container due to fire or breaking in using metal cutting instruments.
- the smoke detector sensor's 310 N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.1 Hz shown in Step 801 .
- Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated shown in Step 802 .
- Filtered signal A F is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If A F exceeds A* by more than 3% shown in Step 803 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential smoke content inside the container shown in Step 805 . If A F exceeds A* by more than 10%, the integrated sensor processing procedure reports smoke content inside the container shown in Step 806 . However, if A F does not exceed A* by more than 10%, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential smoke content inside the container shown in Step 805 .
- the some detector sensor 310 N is calibrated once during activation of security module.
- FIG. 9 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor.
- the algorithm is used to record relative humidity inside the container.
- the humidity sensor's 310 N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.1 Hz as shown in Step 901 .
- Sampled sensor signal is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated shown in Step 902 .
- Filtered signal passes two-stage evaluation. If relative humidity exceeds 85% as shown in Step 903 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside the container shown in Step 906 . If relative humidity exceeds 95% as shown in Step 904 , the integrated sensor processing procedure reports high humidity inside the container as shown in Step 905 . However, if relative humidity does not exceed 95% as shown in Step 904 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside the container shown in Step 906 .
- FIG. 10 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor. Aside from recording the temperature inside the container in order to manage cargo storage conditions, the algorithm is able to monitor the rate of temperature change.
- the temperature sensor's 310 N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.3 Hz as shown in Step 1001 .
- Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated as shown in Step 1002 .
- Filtered signal A F is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If A F exceeds A* by more than 2° C. shown in Step 1003 , the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers shown in Step 1007 . If A F exceeds A* by more than 5° C. as shown in Step 1006 , the integrated signal processing procedure 470 reports drastic change of temperature inside the container shown in Step 1009 . However, if A F does not exceed A* by more than 5° C.
- Step 1006 the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers shown in Step 1007 .
- Temperature sensor is recalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring shown in Steps 1004 , 1005 , 1008 and 1110 . Recalibration is required because containers heat up and cool down in a broad temperature range during day/night cycle.
- FIG. 11 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by an incremental door opening sensors. In order to obtain more reliable judgment, two sensors are installed per container door.
- the door opening sensors 310 L are queued with frequency 0.3 Hz.
- each sensor is queued thrice as shown in Step 1101 , after which each sensor's condition is determined using majorization as part of the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 as shown in Step 1102 . Based on obtained values, a judgment is drawn about condition of each container door as shown in Step 1103 . If both sensors indicate closed door as shown in Step 1104 , the door is reported to be closed. If both sensors indicate opened door as shown in Step 1104 , the door is reported to be opened as shown in Step 1106 . If sensor indications are inconsistent, sensor signal processing procedure reports potential opening of the door as shown in Step 1105 .
- FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone, which enables CSD to record noise caused by container breaking tools, and to determine possible type of tool.
- the microphone 310 P is queued in sessions in 2 second intervals. This saves CSD power while avoiding the danger of missing the noise of tools' operation.
- Measurement session T lasts 0.2 seconds as shown in Step 1201 .
- amplitude of microphone signal is verified across the entire frequency band. If input signal A inp is below preset threshold A min as shown in Step 1202 , subsequent signal processing is skipped until next measurement cycle as shown in Step 1201 . Otherwise, power of received signal
- Second level of processing takes place then, which includes spectrum analysis of signal power in order to determine the type of tool used to break in the container as show in Step 1205 .
- bands exhibiting signal amplitude above preset threshold A inp f >A min f are gated out across the entire frequency range.
- Step 1205 a spectrum power array at different frequency bands S is generated.
- Each container-breaking tool is characterized by its own array of sound spectrum power S i *, limited from below.
- Tool of breaking is determined in comparing arrays S and S i *. If arrays S included in an array of sound spectrum power Si as shown in Step 1205 , then breaking took place and tool of breaking is recognized as shown in Step 1207 . However, if arrays S is not included in an array of sound spectrum power S i as shown in Step 1205 , then breaking took place but tool of breaking is unknown as shown in Step 1206 .
- FIG. 13 illustrates a flowchart of method of detecting and registering a container intrusion signal based on UMPR.
- UMPR enables to construct a unique digital imprint of container interior, representing arrangement of items within radar coverage. The imprint would change reflecting changes in arrangement of interior items.
- the UMPR 310 J In order to obtain the imprint, the UMPR 310 J emits 2 ms-long pulses in ultrasonic frequency, such as 40 kHz as shown in Step 1301 . Meanwhile, the UMPR 310 J receiver stays idle. Emitted signal reflects repeatedly from container interior items and then returns to the UMPR 310 J, where it is received by ultrasonic receiver. Receiver goes online for 50 ms after the pulse has been sent as shown in Step 1302 . Changes in amplitude of received signal for this period are the imprint of container interior.
- ultrasonic frequency such as 40 kHz
- UMPR receiver signal is sampled with at least double frequency of emitted signal.
- Obtained set of N values Y ⁇ N> is compared against reference imprint X ⁇ N> using correlation functions as shown in Step 1303 .
- ⁇ ? ⁇ indicates text missing or illegible when filed ⁇
- Step 1305 a judgment is drawn about changes in container interior as shown in Step 1305 .
- the accelerometers 310 C are included within CSD 140 and are used to create a Digital Signature (DS) and may be used to identify location of cargo within the container.
- FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters that may be used to form this DS.
- M is the mass of the cargo
- Rm represents the coordinates of the center of mass within the body frame, which is strictly connected with the container itself
- Ix, Iy, Iz are components of the container moment of inertia, which characterize the mass distribution with respect to the center of mass.
- DS is thus defined by these parameters set which may define the expected motion of the container. Changes in one or more of these measured parameters may, therefore, correspond to certain events during cargo transportation. For example, if DS has not changed, the cargo is intact. If, M and Ix, Iy, Iz are the same but Rm has changed, the cargo may not be stolen or damaged, but may have moved within the container 130 (i.e., the coordinates of the center of mass Rm change as the cargo moves within the container). It may, therefore, be necessary to check fastenings of the cargo within the container.
- parameter M does not change, but parameters Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm have changed, it is probably that the cargo has not been stolen (it can be precisely determined based on the degree of the parameters change). However, it is also possible that a partial destruction of the cargo took place (e.g., damage resulting from inaccurate unloading). Change of the moment of inertia with respect to the center of mass may occur due to this destruction. If all parameters of the DS have changed, it is likely that the container has been tampered with. The determination of DS allows not only to reveal theft without opening the container, but may also provide continual monitoring of the cargo's condition.
- the accelerometers 310 C as shown in FIG. 3 , that are included within the CSD 140 , form a Mass-tomograph 1500 , as shown in FIG. 15 .
- the plurality of accelerometers that form the Mass-tomograph are coupled to walls of the container 130 .
- the Mass-tomograph 1500 is used to construct a spatial picture of mass distribution within the container 130 .
- FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1500 in accordance with one embodiment.
- Mass-tomograph 1500 may, for example, be used to subtract effects of the surroundings on the accelerometers measurements.
- the initial calibration of accelerometers may occur without any cargo in the container.
- a second round of measurements may occur when an object or a cargo (e.g., cargo 1510 ) is placed inside the container 130 .
- the calibration measurements of the accelerometers are subtracted from the second round of measurements to eliminate influence of the container itself, and the accelerometer measurements are thus only determined for the object 1510 mass.
- FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1600 that is external to container 130 and when the container 130 is in steady position.
- the Mass-tomograph is used as a device to obtain imaging of the contents of the container.
- the mass-tomograph 1600 monitors the whole container 130 .
- the quality of the spatial mass distribution of the container mass depends on two parameters: the accuracy of accelerometers and the distance, laccel 1620 , between adjacent accelerometers 310 C that form the Mass-tomograph 1600 .
- FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1700 when the container 130 is moving.
- Mass-tomograph 1700 may, for example represent mass-tomograph 1600 , FIG. 16 .
- the mass-tomograph 1700 scans the container 130 , as the container 130 moves gradually through the Mass-tomograph 1700 ; in this example the container 130 moves with a steady speed Vcont 1720 .
- a high quality spatial mass distribution inside the container 130 may be determined, since the quality of spatial mass distribution depends only on the accuracy of accelerometers; the perceived distance laccel 1620 between adjacent accelerometers will be minimal due to the movement of the container.
- the microcontroller 330 activates one or more local alert mechanisms (e.g., sound devices 320 A and/or light device 320 B, as shown in FIG. 3 ) that generate a local alarm signal.
- the microcontroller 330 may also activate transceivers 350 A- 350 C to transmit a message that includes this alert via antennas 360 B- 360 D to the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 .
- the microcontroller 330 also determines time intervals used to activate the transceivers 350 A- 350 C during communication with the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170 . In one example, these time intervals may be determined by the NOC 170 .
- the CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of the container 130 by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue.
- the CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of the container 130 by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue.
- the power unit 370 of the CSD 140 may include one or more storage batteries 370 A.
- the power unit 370 may also be configured to receive electrical power from a power source of the cargo transport vehicle. In this case, if the power source is interrupted, the power unit 370 may revert to use of the storage batteries 370 A and/or solar power, for example. In the event of a power interruption or if the storage battery charge falls below a threshold level, the CSD 140 may transmit, via antennas 360 , a power interrupt alarm to the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 .
- the microcontroller 330 may also implement power-management techniques to reduce power consumption. For example, one or more time window(s) may be specified, during initialization process or via transceivers 350 A- 350 C, to define activation times for one or more components of CSD 140 .
- the CSD 140 may switch into a sleep (suspend) mode to avoid unnecessary power utilization. In fact, sleep mode may account for a significant part of the life of the CSD 140 ; the CSD 140 may operate over several years without need of storage battery replacement. In one example of operation, the CSD 140 remains awake (i.e., does not switch to sleep mode) when communicating with the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 .
- the CSD 140 may also switch from sleep to awake mode if any one anti-tamper sensor of block 310 exceeds a certain threshold level.
- FIG. 18 shows a block diagram illustrating one exemplary Bridge 1800 .
- Bridge 1800 may, for example, represent bridge 150 of FIG. 1 .
- the Bridge 1800 includes a Microcontroller unit 1810 , GPS receiver 1830 , Cellular Modem 1840 A, Satellite Modem 184013 , WLAN Interface 1840 C, ethernet interface 1850 A, User interface 1850 B, External connection interface 1850 C, Antennas Block 1860 and Power Unit 1870 .
- the block of Antennas 1860 includes GPS antenna 1860 A, Cellular antenna 1860 B, Satellite antenna 1860 C, and International Frequency Band Local Area Communication antenna 1860 D.
- the Cellular modem 1840 A is utilized to communicate with the NOC 170 via cellular communication channel 160 A, for example.
- the Satellite modem 1840 B is utilized to communicate with the NOC 170 via satellite communication channel 160 B, for example.
- the WLAN interface 1840 C is utilized to communicate with the CSD 140 via LAN 160 C.
- the CSD 140 communicates to the NOC 170 via the Bridge 1800 . Communication from the CSD 140 to the NOC 170 is less costly when the Bridge 1800 is utilized to relay the communication. In one example, it saves energy compare to when the CSD communicates with the NOC 170 directly via cellular or satellite communications channels. In one example, the CSD 140 transmits the system status, including any alert status, to the Bridge 1800 upon request of the NOC 170 .
- the Bridge's 1800 includes a power unit 1870 which may receive power from a power network 1870 B.
- power unit 1870 may be configured to switch over to utilize Storage batteries 1870 A.
- This power interruption may be detected by the microcontroller unit 1810 , for example, which may transmit an alarm message to the NOC 170 .
- the alarm message may, for example, identify the bridge 1800 by an identification code, the location of the ship provided by the GPS receiver 1830 , the date and time of the alarm, and further description of the alarm event (e.g., loss of ship's power).
- FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Stationary Bridge 1900 according to one embodiment.
- the Stationary Bridge 1900 may be placed in the areas of high container concentration, such as places of consolidation/deconsolidation of containers, ports, terminals, etc.
- Stationary Bridge 1900 may be used for continuous communication with the NOC 170 .
- Stationary Bridge 1900 includes the WLAN Interface 1910 and the Ethernet interface 1920 .
- Stationary Bridge 1900 may not include a user interface. Further, since the geographical location of the Stationary Bridge 1900 remains the same, it may not require a GPS receiver.
- FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Portative Bridge 2000 according to one embodiment.
- the Portative Bridge 2000 may be used where containers are transported, such as on ships, trains, etc.
- the Portative Bridge 2000 includes a GPS receiver 2010 , a Cellular Modem 2020 A, a Satellite modem 2020 B, a WLAN 2020 C, an External connection interface 2030 and an Antenna Block 2060 .
- the Portative Bridge 2000 uses cellular 160 A and satellite 160 B communication channels.
- the Portative Bridge 2000 may not have a user interface.
- FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Service Bridge 2100 according to one embodiment.
- the Service Bridge 2100 may be used to support and communicate with one or more CSDs 140 .
- the Service Bridge 2100 may include a cellular modem 2120 A, a satellite-modem 2120 B, a WLAN 2120 C, a user interface 2130 A, an External connection interface 2130 B and an Antenna block 2160 .
- the service Bridge 2100 may communicates with the NOC 170 via other Stationary and/or Portative Bridges (e.g., portative bridge 1100 ) using UBFT 160 C and/or through the Cellular 160 A and/or satellite 160 B communication channels.
- FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC 2200 .
- the NOC 2200 may, for example, represent NOC 170 of FIG. 1 .
- the NOC 2200 may include a plurality of terminals 2210 and servers 2220 interconnected via Internet 2250 .
- the servers 2220 may include a Data Base 2230 .
- the data base 2230 may, for example, be used to store sensor data and may contained archives of container events received from one or more CSDs 140 .
- the data base 2230 may also store information pertaining to the location and condition of cargo containers.
- the NOC 170 may use the services of a Commercial world wide digital cellular communication operator 2260 A, configured to communicate with the CSD 140 and/or the Bridge 150 via the cellular communication channels 160 A.
- the NOC 170 may also use the service of a Commercial world wide satellite digital communication operator 2260 B that configured to communicate with the CSD 140 and/or the Bridge 150 via satellite communication channels 160 B.
- FIG. 23 illustrates a more detailed diagram of the system server 2220 and its interaction with other system elements.
- the server is comprised of a software complex and the database 2230 .
- server includes following software: database, program for communication with CSD 2380 , programs for communication with operator terminals 2350 , and program for analysis of CSD sensor data 2370 .
- the database 2230 contains identification and custom data of secured objects, their condition, CSD operation parameters and commands issued to security modules by system operators.
- the database can also include data from CSD sensors for its further detailed examination by server means.
- the CSD communication program 2380 receives CSD data during communication session established directly or via bridge, moves the data to server database, extracts operator commands and required service data from the database and sends them to modules.
- the operator terminal communication program 2350 could be used for data exchange with custom terminal programs installed on user computers, or for development of web interface accessible by any authorized user from any computer without dedicated software installed. Accordingly, there can be two types of operator terminals: computer with terminal application installed 2310 and/or computer with a web browser 2330 .
- the computer with terminal application installed 2310 has the advantage of quick data exchange.
- the computer with web browser 2330 provides easy access to the system. Both applications handle operator commands issuing to CSD, their saving in the database and transfer of information about secured objects from database to operator terminals.
- the CSD sensor data analysis program 2370 is used when CSD software is incapable to process sensor data to the level sufficient for deciding on condition of secured object due to its limited computing performance.
- the CSD sensor data analysis program extracts CSD sensor data from the database, processes it and concludes about the condition of CSD and secured object. Calculation results are stored in server database 2230 .
- FIG. 24 shows a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 2399 for monitoring container integrity in accordance with one embodiment.
- the initiation step 2400 includes a data packet that is downloaded into CSD's 140 microcontroller 330 .
- the data packet includes certain parameters that remain unchanged during the lifetime of the CSD 140 . These parameters include an identification code for the CSD 140 , an address of a server that may be used to communicate with the CSD, and associated parameters of communication, etc.
- the initiation of the CSD 140 may, for example, be done by the Bridge 150 or other equipment (not shown).
- the operation of the CSD 140 is cyclic. Each CSD cycle lasts one container trip/route (i.e., from the moment of uploading to before the unloading of the container 130 ).
- the CSD 140 is activated by the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170 .
- the CSD's microcontroller 330 is cleared of any previously stored information. New information pertaining to the container's route and movement schedule, as well as parameters and logic that use regimes pertaining to the container's 130 safety, are downloaded into the microcontroller 330 .
- the CSD is placed in the active mode, in Step 2402 , by the Bridge 150 or by the server 2220 of the NOC 170 .
- condition of the container 130 and its cargo are continually or periodically monitored.
- the CSD microcontroller 330 checks for an alert status from the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 in Step 2404 .
- the microcontroller 330 checks if it is a time for the packet of the information pertaining to the container's condition to be sent to the NOC 170 .
- the microcontroller 330 also checks if the request for communication with the NOC 170 was received from the Bridge 150 . If the NOC 170 receives a message containing an alert status from the CSD 140 , the NOC 170 sends a request to the CSD's 140 GPS receiver 340 . In response to this request, the GPS receiver determines the geographical location of the CSD 140 in Step 2410 , and sends this location information to the microcontroller 330 .
- the CSD 140 may also determine its geographical location by requesting location information from the bridge 150 .
- the microcontroller 330 may also periodically request location information from either the GPS receiver 340 or the bridge 150 .
- the microcontroller sends the request to the GPS receiver in Step 2420
- the GPS receiver 340 determines the geographical position of the container 130 in Step 2422 .
- Step 2412 the CSD 140 establishes connection to the NOC 170 .
- the CSD 140 communicates with the NOC 170 through the Bridge 150 using Unlicensed International Frequency Band Local Area Communication Network 160 C.
- the CSD 140 may communicate with the NOC 170 via cellular communications channels 160 A or satellite communications channels 160 B.
- the CSD's communication via the Bridge 150 may be less expensive and may also save energy, as compared to contacting the NOC 170 directly via cellular 160 A or satellite 160 B communication channels.
- the CSD 140 sends the information packet to the NOC 170 .
- This packet may include one or more of the transmission time, the channel of communication, level of batteries charge, location of the CSD etc.
- the NOC 170 requests that the CSD 140 perform certain commands, in Step 2414 , pertaining to further operation of the CSD 140 , including a regime for monitoring containers safety, etc.
- the CSD 140 may receive a command from the NOC 170 to deactivate the CSD 140 .
- step 2416 the CSD verifies that the received command is a deactivation command and, if it is, the CSD deactivates in Step 2418 ; otherwise Steps 2404 - 2416 are performed continually until a deactivation command is received.
- the CSD 140 may deactivate at route completion before the cargo is unloaded. During this deactivation period, the CSD 140 ceases to monitor containers and cargo safety.
- Proposed system could be employed not only for providing security to general ISO containers, but also for ensuring safety of other moving objects, such as vehicles, boats, etc., as well as of remote fixed objects, e.g. country houses. The difference in these cases is the mobile module at secured object.
- FIG. 25 illustrates the diagram of one potential system application—a personal conditions monitoring system 2500 .
- the system could be employed for monitoring health conditions and accumulated workload of physically weakened persons, those in need for constant medical supervision, as well as specialists directly engaged in potentially dangerous activities. Examples include military and special services personnel, professional drivers, athletes, alpinis6, etc.
- security module could be used for monitoring personal conditions, accumulated physical load, for recording events occurred to the person (falling, impacts, changes of position of the body, traveling in transport, etc.), as well as for recording events in the immediate vicinity of the person (gunshots, explosions, changes of temperature and humidity, etc.).
- Monitoring module for example could be the CSD 140 , which includes: the sensor array 310 and ADC 320 , computing subsystem comprised of the microcontroller 330 and memory unit, communication subsystem including the transceiver 350 and the antenna 360 , and power subsystem with replaceable batteries 370 .
- the combination of sensors is determined by the purpose of the module.
- the accelerometers 310 C could be used as they enable to monitor position and movement of a person, his pulse and a number of events in the surroundings, and electrodes for measuring amplitude-time parameters of heart biopotentials (ECG) and electrical impedance of the body to automatically estimate functional state of cardiovascular system on the basis of data obtained in examination of electrical activity of the heart, type of vegetative regulation of the rhythm and central gemodynamic parameters obtained in automatic syndromal ECG diagnostics, heart rate variability analysis and impedancegram analysis of the body.
- ECG heart biopotentials
- monitoring module continuously monitors sensor indications, performs initial processing of measured values, concludes about the condition of the person or events occurred to him, and sends data to the server 2220 .
- Data is sent to server if personal conditions have changed or when certain emergency events occur, and periodically, e.g. hourly. Data is transferred over a wireless Wi-Fi based link 160 C or using cellular networks 160 B.
- the server 2220 receives information from the monitoring module 140 , performs its additional processing if necessary, and stores it in the database 2230 . In emergency cases, server sends SMS notification to phone numbers specified for the person.
- Terminal program displays all data on the terminal 2310 available at the server in real-time, notifying operator in emergency if necessary.
Abstract
A security system for monitoring a shipping container being transported by a cargo transport vehicle has a Container Security Device (CSD) removably coupled to a shipping container wall. The CSD monitors cargo inside the container and detects intrusions into the vehicle and damage to the container wall. The CSD includes an anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller, and a communication device. The microcontroller generates an alarm signal based on a signal from the anti-tamper sensor and records container events. The anti-temper sensor undergoes individual and integrated sensor processing procedures. The integrated sensor processing procedure determines the overall container alert status using an alarm signal from at least one sensor. The system also has a Network Operations Center (NOC) for communicating with a telecommunications network. The NOC receives data from each CSD, includes a data storage medium for storing sensor data, and has an archive of the container events.
Description
- This application is a continuation application of co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 13/195,637, filed on Aug. 1, 2011, which is a continuation application of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/343,560, filed on Jan. 30, 2006, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,990,270, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 60/648,260, filed on Jan. 28, 2005. Priority to each of the prior applications is expressly claimed, and the disclosures of the applications are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entireties and for all purposes.
- Cargo loss due to theft has become a serious problem. Cargo is often misappropriated by shipping company employees, cargo handlers, and/or security-personnel. Many insurance professionals believe that more than half of all major cargo thefts are planned in logistics departments, by employees at the shipper or manufacturer who are thought to be trustworthy. Certain authorities believe that gangs operating in many metropolitan areas are actually training some of their members in logistics so that they will be eligible for employment at desirable trucking, warehousing or forwarding firms.
- Because of the emergence of terrorist threats and activities, container security has become a national security issue. Terrorists are exploiting transportation modalities such as air, rail, truck-trailer, vessel-barge and bus. As evidenced by recent attacks, terrorists are directing, or seeking to direct, mobile transportation assets into office building and/or other heavily populated areas.
- Shipping containers may also be used by terrorists for the arms shipments. Of greatest concern is the shipment of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. Some of these materials are relatively small in size and could be hidden in shipping containers without being detected by governmental authorities. If such weapons were to fall into the wrong hands the results could be devastating.
- With the above scenarios in mind, improving container security is desired. In one approach that is commonly in use, a locking mechanism or security seal are applied to-container doors, to seal the cargo within the container. However, anyone who possesses the key or the combination, whether authorized or not, may gain access to the interior of a container. Further, the locks can be easily picked or removed by-other means. Thus, locking devices are a limited deterrent to thieves or terrorists.
- In another approach an electronic seal (“e-seal”) may be applied to a container. These e-seals are similar to traditional door seals and applied to the containers via the same, albeit weak, door hasp mechanism. These e-seals include an electronic device, such as a radio or radio reflective device that can transmit the e-seal's serial number and a signal if the e-seal is cut or broken after installation. However, the e-seal does not communicate with the interior or contents of the container and does not transmit information related to the interior or contents to other devices.
- The e-seal typically employs either a low power radio transceiver or uses radio frequency backscatter techniques to convey information from an e-seal to a reader installed at, for example, a terminal gate. The radio frequency backscatter technique involves use of a relatively expensive, narrow band, high-power radio technology based on a combination of radar and radiobroadcast technologies. The radio frequency backscatter technology requires that a reader send a radio signal of relatively high transmitted power (i.e., 0.5-3 W) that is reflected or scattered back to the reader with modulated or encoded data from the e-seal.
- Furthermore, the e-seals are not effective at monitoring security of the container. For example, other methods of intrusion into the container may occur (e.g. breaching other parts of the container such as the side walls). Further, a biological agent may be implanted into the container through the container's standard air vents.
- Present worldwide transportation security system (transportation security system) provides cost effective and reliable system of and method for: (1) registering any event in connection with breach of any wall in a container; (2) detecting an opening, a closing and a removal of the container's doors; (3) monitoring the condition of all seals and locks on the container; (4) monitoring a cargo conditions inside the container; (5) detecting human or an animal inside the container; (6) monitoring the container's movement; (7) detecting weapons of mass destruction in the container; (8) registration of movement inside the container; (9) measuring cargo weight inside the container; (10) registering environmental parameters inside the container (temperature, humidity, smoke . . . etc.); and (11) simultaneously providing means for tracking movements of the container for reasons of security and logistic efficiency. The integrity system may generate false alarms with the probability equal to or better than of 10−5:10−6.
- The transportation security system provides intermodal threat identification, detection, and notification transportation security system. The transportation security system may be applied to all transpiration modalities including air, rail, truck, ship, barge and bus transport modes. The instant security system provides inexpensive means to monitoring each shipping container. Container tempering may be detected and reported rapidly. Thus, present transportation security system could be a credible defense mechanism against terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons, weapons materials, and/or terrorist personnel by preventing unauthorized access to shipping containers. The threat of cargo theft or piracy is also mitigated. Thus, present transportation security system provides governmental and law enforcement agencies with the means to respond, in real-time, to cargo theft, piracy, and/or terrorist attacks.
- One aspect of the present application is security system for monitoring at least one shipping container. The system includes a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at least one shipping container the CSD monitors a cargo inside the container and detects intrusion the container. The CSD includes at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device. The microcontroller generates an alert status based on an output signals from at least one sensor. The output signals may be subjected to an individual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing procedure. The integrated sensor processing procedure makes a decision of the container alert status based on the output status of the at least one sensor. A Network Operations Center (NOC) includes a NOC communications facility configured to communicate with at least one telecommunication network. The NOC being configured to receive data from one or more CSDs. The NOC includes a data storage medium configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the container events.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a transportation security system for monitoring a plurality of shipping containers being transported by a plurality of cargo transport vehicles. Each of the plurality of cargo vehicles transports at least one shipping container. The system includes a CSD removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection of intrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one sensor. The CSD also includes a microcontroller and communication device. The system may also include a plurality of bridges. Each bridge of the plurality of bridges may be disposed in one cargo transport vehicle. Each bridge may include a communication system being configured to communicate with the CSDs and a NOC. The bridge may also include a data storage medium configured to store data pertaining to container events. A NOC communicates with each of the plurality of bridges and CSDs. The NOC may receive data from one or more of the plurality of bridges and CSDs. The NOC includes a data storage medium configured to store one or more of sensor data and container events.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a method for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle. The method includes providing a CSD configured to be removably coupled to the at least one shipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detecting intrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one sensor. The CSD includes a microcontroller and a CSD communications device. The method may also include sending output data obtained from at least one sensor to the microcontroller.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a method for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a destination point. The method includes providing route data corresponding to the path traversed by at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a destination point. An actual position of at least one cargo vehicle is monitored to determine whether the actual position of the vehicle corresponds to the route data. An alert status condition is generated when the actual position of the vehicle does not correspond to the route data. A NOC is notified of the alert status.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing data transmitted between a CSD and a bridge. The CSD being removably coupled to at least one shipping container disposed on a cargo transport vehicle. The bridge is disposed on the cargo transport vehicle. The data structure includes: a container CSD identification field containing data that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containing either CSD status data or bridge command data depending on a course of the packet.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing data being transmitted between a bridge and a NOC. The bridge being configured to monitor at least one container CSD configured to be removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container disposed on a cargo transport vehicle. The bridge being disposed on the cargo transport vehicle. The data structure includes: a bridge identification field containing data that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containing either bridge-status or the NOC command data depending on the source of the packet.
- In another aspect, the present application includes a personal conditions monitoring system. The system includes a monitoring module. The monitoring module includes sensor array and ADC. The system includes a communication subsystem and a power subsystem with replaceable batteries. The communication subsystem includes transceiver and antenna.
- Additional features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the detailed description which follows, and in part will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art from that description or recognized by practicing the invention as described herein, including the detailed description which follows, the claims and the drawings.
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FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the transportation security system depicted inFIG. 1 . -
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a Container Security Device (CSD). -
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal. -
FIG. 5 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer. -
FIG. 6 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor. -
FIG. 7 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage. -
FIG. 8 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a smoke detector. -
FIG. 9 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor. -
FIG. 10 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor. -
FIG. 11 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a door-opening sensor. -
FIG. 12 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone. -
FIG. 13 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a UMPR. -
FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters for measuring a digital signature. -
FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted inFIG. 15 when the container is steady. -
FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted inFIG. 15 when the container is moving. -
FIG. 18 shows a block diagram of one exemplary bridge. -
FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of the bridge, depicted inFIG. 18 , when stationary. -
FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary portative bridge depicted inFIG. 18 . -
FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary service bridge depicted inFIG. 18 . -
FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary Network Operations Center depicted inFIG. 1 . -
FIG. 23 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC server depicted inFIG. 22 . -
FIG. 24 shows a flowchart showing one exemplary method for monitoring container integrity. -
FIG. 25 shows a diagramed depiction of personal conditions monitoring system. -
FIG. 1 shows one exemplarytransportation security system 100 in accordance with one embodiment. Each mode of transportation (e.g., transportation by ship) is monitored and tracked usingtransportation security system 100. Aship 110 is illustratively shown carrying a plurality ofshipping containers 130. Eachshipping container 130 has a Container Security Device (“CSD”) 140 that communicates with a Network Operations Center (“NOC”) 170, preferably via aBridge 150. When theCSD 140 detects a break-in violation, an alert status is generated and transmitted toNOC 170, via theBridge 150. TheCSD 140 communicates with theBridge 150 using an Unlicensed International Frequency Band LocalArea Communication Network 160C. However, if theCSD 140 unable to communicate with theNOC 170 through theBridge 150, theCSD 140 may communicate with theNOC 170 via acellular communications channel 160A or asatellite communication channel 160B. The alert status generated by theCSD 140, when onboard a ship for example, includes the identity of thecontainer 130, in which also is located, the location of theship 110, the time and date of the alert status generation, and a description of the alert status. TheNOC 170, upon receipt of the alert status, may either confirm or reject the alert status. If the alert status is confirmed, theNOC 170 may generate an alarm signal. -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram further illustrating thetransportation security system 100 ofFIG. 1 . In particular,FIG. 2 illustratively shows communication betweenCSD 140,NOC 170 andBridge 150 in further detail. In this example, theCSD 140 is shown communicating with theNOC 170 via cellular 160A orsatellite 160B communications. TheBridge 150 is also shown communicate with theNOC 170 via cellular 160A orsatellite 160B connection. TheBridge 150 may also communicate with theNOC 170 via an Ethernet connection 160D, for example. -
FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrates one exemplary CSD 300. CSD 300 may, for example, representCSD 140 ofFIG. 1 . The CSD 300 includes aSensor Block 310, alocal alert mechanism 320, aMicrocontroller 330, aGPS receiver 340, aCellular Modem 350A, aSatellite Modem 350B, a wireless LAN (WLAN)Interface 350C, anAntenna Block 360 and aPower Unit 370. TheWLAN Interface 350C uses one of the standard type Unlicensed International Frequency transceiver like Bluetooth Zigbee etc. - The
Sensor Block 310 is illustratively shown with aLight Sensor 310A, aCapacity Proximity Sensor 310B, anAccelerometer 310C, a Micro Power Radar (MPR) 310D, anInductive Sensor 310E, aRFID reader 310F, a Strain Gage 310G. TheSensor Block 310 may also include one or more of: aPiezosensor 310H, anUltrasonic Sensor 3101, aMicrophone 310P, an Ultrasound Micropower Radar (UMPR) 310J, anInfrared Sensor 310K, aDoor Opening Sensor 310L, aSeal Break Sensor 310M, a Sensor control parameters of surrounding 310N, as shown inFIG. 4 . Sensor control parameters ofsurroundings 310N may include one or more of: a Temperature Sensor, a Smoke Detector Sensor, a Humidity Sensor, etc. TheAntenna block 360 includes aGPS antenna 360A, aCellular antenna 360B, aSatellite antenna 360C, and a lowpower LAN antenna 360D. - In one example of operation,
microcontroller 330 monitors output ofsensor block 310 to determine an alert status. If an alert status is determined,microcontroller 330 may provideCellular modem 350A,Satellite modem 350B and/orLAN interface 350C with a formatted message packet. This message packet may, for example, be transmitted from the Antenna block 360 to either theBridge 150 or theNOC 170. Transmission message packets from theBridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 (seeFIG. 1 andFIG. 2 ) are received by theAntenna block 360 and directed to one or more of theCellular modem 350A, theSatellite modem 350B and theLAN interface 350C.Microcontroller 330 may then process theBridge 150 and/or theNOC 170 message packet to receive information and/or instructions from theNOC 170, for example. -
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 399 for detecting and registering container intrusion signals (e.g., alert statuses).Accelerometer 310C,Piezosensor 310H andUltrasonic sensor 3101,Microphone 310P output signals are monitored by themicrocontroller 330, which thus identifiessensors 310 that exceed one or more pre-set threshold levels. - Once the
container 130 is loaded with its payload, themicrocontroller 330 operates in a calibration mode. The container's 130 walls may be struck several time and ‘images’ of these hits may be recorded and stored in a pulling library of images 425 in themicrocontroller 330 for use as calibration images pertaining to thisparticular container 130. In one example, one or more exemplary images of intrusion or damage to thecontainer 130 may also be stored in the library of images 425. - The
microcontroller 330 identifies signals that exceed certain threshold levels. These signals may be separated bymicrocontroller 330, inStep 400, into asingle hit signal 405 and/or a series of hit signals 407. Within themicrocontroller 330, a Short Time Fast Fourier Analysis is used to process thesingle hit signal 405, inStep 410, and a Wavelet analysis may also be performed, inStep 415. An image of the single hit signal is then created. Correlation Functions inStep 420 and Theory of Sample Recognition inStep 430 are utilized to compare the hit image to the exemplary images stored within the library of images 425. If themicrocontroller 330 determines that the single hit image correlates with to the images of intrusion into a damaged container, a majority voting algorithm is applied to the single hit image. The majority voting algorithm is a part of an integratedsensor processing procedure 470. - The majority voting algorithm is based on major voting mark of unrelated criteria. Each criterion may be assigned positive and/or negative points. When the majority voting algorithm is applied to the image of the single hit signal the decision about intrusion attempt is based on voting process based on sum of all points given during processing of the hit signal image. If the sum of total points given to the hit signal image indicates that an intrusion attempt took place, the single hit image is further subjected to the integrated
sensor processing procedure 470, which makes a decision as to if intrusion occurred. - The majority voting algorithm may also be applied to the series of hit signals 407 in
Step 470. If the sum of total points given during processing of the series of hit signals 407 indicates that intrusion, or even an intrusion attempt, occurred, the series of hit signals 407 are subjected to an integratedsensor processing procedure 470 which makes a decision as to if the intrusion occurred. - If the data processed by integrated
sensor processing procedure 470 is incomplete or inconsistent, this data is sent by theCSD 140 to theNOC 170 for a further analysis. In this case the NOC 170 (i.e., not the CSD 140) will make the decision as to if intrusion occurred. - The
microcontroller 330 may also utilizecorrelation functions 420 to compare output from theAccelerometer 310C and other sensors like thePiezosensor 310H and/or theUltrasonic sensor 3101 to an exemplary image that corresponds to a signal generating by a metal cutting instrument, for example, stored in the library of images 425. If, inStep 420, themicrocontroller 330 determines that theintrusion signal 420 correlates to the stored signal image generated by a metal cutting instrument 425, the intrusion signal is then further subjected to an integratedsensor processing procedure 470 that makes a decision as to if the intrusion took place. - Output signals from the
accelerometer 310C may also be monitored bymicrocontroller 330 to detect vibration of the container wall. Once avibration signal 402 of the container wall is detected by themicrocontroller 330, themicrocontroller 330 may process, instep 403, thevibration signal 402 to produce a wavelet analysis and a “window” Fourier analysis for comparison, instep 440, to one or more recorded images of library of images 425 to determine which mode of transportation is used to move thecontainer 130. The integratedsensor processing procedure 470 may then be applied to these signals to determine the mode of transport or if an intrusion took place. - An output signal from the light sensor's 310A may be monitored by the
microcontroller 330 to determine intrusion or fire. For example, if themicrocontroller 330 determines that the output signal indicates that the measured light within the container exceeds a certain rate of change threshold, themicrocontroller 330 may initiate further analysis of the output signal, and/or other sensor signals, to determine if an intrusion is occurring, and/or if there is presence of smoke: If themicrocontroller 330 determines that an intrusion has occurred and/or smoke is present, the output signal may be subjected to further processing by theintegrated sensor procedure 470 to make the decision that intrusion occurred or not. - Output signals from the capacitive proximity sensor's 310B, Strain gage 310G and
RFID reader 310 F outputs also may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect addition or removal of objects from thecontainer 130. The output signals may, for example, be analyzed by themicrocontroller 330,Step 445, to detect change in the cargo mass. If change in cargo mass is detected, the capacitive proximity sensor output may be subjected to the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 which makes a decision about the alert status of thecontainer 130. - An output signal from the capacitive proximity's
sensor 310B may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to determine if any objects are in close proximity to locks and seals of thecontainer 130. If any objects are detected in close proximity to the locks and the seals of thecontainer 130, the output signals from one or more sensors may be further analyzed within themicrocontroller 330 to determine if a break-in has occurred. If a break-in is detected by themicrocontroller 330, further analysis of these signals may be made by the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. - Output signals from sensors are monitored by the
microcontroller 330 in control parameters of surrounding 310N. These sensors may, for example, include a temperature sensor that produces an output signal which may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect thermal excursions outside one or more predetermined temperature ranges and/or to detect rates of change in temperature that occur outside one or more predefined rates of change. If, for example, themicrocontroller 330 determines that the sensed temperature is outside predetermined temperature ranges and/or that the rate of temperature change if outside these predetermined limits, output signals from one or more sensors will be further analyzed by theintegrated sensor procedure 470 to decide if an intrusion occurred. - In another example, an output signal from the smoke detector sensor may be monitored to determine if chemicals are present within the air, and/or air clarity inside the
container 130 exceeds a predefined threshold level. If, for example, a chemical is detected within the air, output signals from one or more sensors will be further analyzed by the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to make decision as to thecontainer 130 alert status. - In another example, an output signal from the
UMPR 310J may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect presence of humans or animals within thecontainer 130. If, for example, presence of humans and/or animals is detected, the output signals from one or more sensors may be further processed by theintegrated sensor procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. TheUMPR 310J may, for example, utilize the Doppler's effect to detect movement inside thecontainer 130. TheUMPR 310J may, for example include an ultrasonic transceiver. This sensor may also be used to detect force entry attempts into thecontainer 130, based upon registration of impact drilling, gas-cutting, etc., by utilization of theUMPR 310J as a highly sensitive UMPR-based microphone. The later purpose is accomplished by applying a procedure to determine, inStep 460, the integrity of the container's wall. If theUMPR 310J output data exceeds the threshold determined inSteps container 130 may be applied. The output data of one or more sensors may then be further analyzed within themicrocontroller 330 for presence of humans/animals or presence of wall integrity failure. If, for example, presence of humans/animals and/or wall destruction are detected, the output signals from one ormore sensors 310 are subjected to theintegrated sensor procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. - Output signals from
sensor MPR 310D may be processed to produce a radioprint (e.g., radio-imprint) based upon locations of the objects inside thecontainer 130. The process of development of devices of radio-imprint described in the Appendixes A. This radioprint may be monitored bymicrocontroller 330 to detect deviations in object location, by comparing the radioprint to an initial radio print recorded during calibration, for example. Radioprints are built based on the analysis of all reflected signals, including signals reflected by objects that are not located in the direct field of the sensor. If, for example,microcontroller 330 detects deviation between a current radioprint and the radioprint recorded during calibration, the radioprints and output signals from other sensors may be subjected to the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to determine if an intrusion occurred. - Output signals from the infrared sensor's 310K may be monitored by the
microcontroller 330 to detect warm objects within the container. If, for example, themicrocontroller 330 detects a warm object, the output signal from one or more sensors may be further analyzed, inStep 465, within themicrocontroller 330 to determine the presence of humans or animals by applying procedures that determines movement inside thecontainer 130. If, for example, humans or animals are detected, output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to theintegrated procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. - An output signal from the
GPS receiver 340 may be monitored to determine a location of theCSD 140, and further to determine if this location differs from a programmed route for thecontainer 130. If, for example, themicrocontroller 330 determines that the current location differs from the programmed route, the output signal may be further analyzed, inStep 435, to determine deviation from the programmed route. If, for example, significant deviation from the programmed route is detected, the output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. - In another example, the
door opening sensor 310L and theseal break sensor 310M are monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect changes in integrity of the doors and seals of thecontainer 130. If themicrocontroller 330 detects changes in integrity, the output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred. - Considering the workload and low performance of standalone CSD microprocessor stemming from strict limitations to its power consumption, a simple accelerometer signal analysis algorithm could often be employed to determine impacts against the structure of secured container.
-
FIG. 5 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by accelerometer. In order to save CSD power, accelerometer indications are monitored in two modes: Standby and Active. In Standby mode, accelerometers are being checked in equal time periods, with frequency FI about 100 Hz in, instead of constant monitoring. Sensors go offline between checkpoints, and module's microcontroller, if not being used, enters sleep mode. - In Standby, the accelerometer's 310C indications are read in time intervals dT=1/F1 in
Step 501. Then theaccelerometer 310C is turned on and themicrocontroller 330 is in Active mode inStep 502. Then the accelerometer's values are taken inStep 503. InStep 504 theaccelerometer 310C is turned off. Based on values obtained, an absolute value of apparent acceleration vector A=√{square root over (Ax 2+Ar 2+Az 2)} and its deviation from gravity vector D=A−1 are determined inStep 505. If D does not exceed preset threshold P1 shown inStep 506, theCSD 140 remains in Standby show inStep 507, otherwise it enters Active mode of accelerometer indications monitoring. P1 should be ˜0.5 g. - In Active mode, accelerometers remain online from the moment of mode entry show in
Step 508 to the moment when D remains below PI threshold shown inStep 513 for N measurement cycles as show inSteps Step 516, then accelerometers 301C are turned off. D is measured and determined in each measurement cycle shown inStep 510 andStep 511 and its maximum value maxD is recorded as shown inStep 509. MaxD is verified upon exiting the Active mode. If the value MaxD exceeds P2 threshold as shown inStep 517, the majority algorithm of the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 indicates an impact against container's structure and time and amplitude of hit have fixed value as shown inStep 518. If, however, the value MaxD does not exceed the threshold P2 microcontroller returns into the Standby mode as shown inStep 519. -
FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a light sensor. The algorithm is used to determine breaking in the container by changed light intensity inside the container as the result of both penetration of outside light and light flashes occurring in metal cutting tools operation. - The light sensor's 310A indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 3 Hz as show in
Step 601. Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated as shown inStep 602. Filtered signal AF is compared in two stages with original sensor readings. If AF exceeds A* by more than 2% as show inStep 603, theintegrated sensor procedure 470 reports potential breaking in the container as show inStep 609. If AF exceeds A* by more than 5% as shown inStep 604, theintegrated sensor procedure 470 reports the break in thecontainer 130 as shown inStep 605. However, if AF does not exceed A* by more than 5% as shown inStep 604 the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports high chance of breaking in the container as show inStep 609. Light sensor is recalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring as show inSteps -
FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a strain gage. The algorithm is used to record damage (alterations) to container structure. - The strain gage 310G is queued with frequency about 1 kHz in 15 ms-long sessions shown in
Step 701. Vector of measured results A<15> is median filtered as shown inStep 702. Measurement sessions occur with frequency about 3 Hz. Filtered signal AF is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If AF exceeds A* by more than 1% as show inStep 703, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports potential damage to container structure as shown inStep 707. If AF exceeds A* by more than 3% as shown inStep 704, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports the break in thecontainer 130 as shown inStep 708. However, if AF does not exceed A* by more than 3% as shown inStep 704, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports potential damage to container structure as shown inStep 707. Strain gage is recalibrated hourly in the process of its monitoring as shown inSteps -
FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion by s smoke detector sensor. The algorithm is used to determine smoke content in the container due to fire or breaking in using metal cutting instruments. - The smoke detector sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.1 Hz shown in
Step 801. Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated shown inStep 802. Filtered signal AF is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If AF exceeds A* by more than 3% shown inStep 803, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports potential smoke content inside the container shown inStep 805. If AF exceeds A* by more than 10%, the integrated sensor processing procedure reports smoke content inside the container shown inStep 806. However, if AF does not exceed A* by more than 10%, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports potential smoke content inside the container shown inStep 805. The somedetector sensor 310N is calibrated once during activation of security module. -
FIG. 9 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a humidity sensor. The algorithm is used to record relative humidity inside the container. - The humidity sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.1 Hz as shown in
Step 901. Sampled sensor signal is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated shown inStep 902. Filtered signal passes two-stage evaluation. If relative humidity exceeds 85% as shown inStep 903, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside the container shown inStep 906. If relative humidity exceeds 95% as shown inStep 904, the integrated sensor processing procedure reports high humidity inside the container as shown inStep 905. However, if relative humidity does not exceed 95% as shown inStep 904, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidity inside the container shown inStep 906. -
FIG. 10 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor. Aside from recording the temperature inside the container in order to manage cargo storage conditions, the algorithm is able to monitor the rate of temperature change. - The temperature sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed with frequency about 0.3 Hz as shown in
Step 1001. Sampled sensor signal A is filtered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminated as shown inStep 1002. Filtered signal AF is compared in two stages with original sensor readings A*. If AF exceeds A* by more than 2° C. shown inStep 1003, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers shown inStep 1007. If AF exceeds A* by more than 5° C. as shown inStep 1006, the integratedsignal processing procedure 470 reports drastic change of temperature inside the container shown in Step 1009. However, if AF does not exceed A* by more than 5° C. as shown inStep 1006, the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers shown inStep 1007. Temperature sensor is recalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring shown inSteps -
FIG. 11 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by an incremental door opening sensors. In order to obtain more reliable judgment, two sensors are installed per container door. - The
door opening sensors 310L are queued with frequency 0.3 Hz. In order to eliminate random errors, each sensor is queued thrice as shown inStep 1101, after which each sensor's condition is determined using majorization as part of the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 as shown inStep 1102. Based on obtained values, a judgment is drawn about condition of each container door as shown inStep 1103. If both sensors indicate closed door as shown inStep 1104, the door is reported to be closed. If both sensors indicate opened door as shown inStep 1104, the door is reported to be opened as shown inStep 1106. If sensor indications are inconsistent, sensor signal processing procedure reports potential opening of the door as shown inStep 1105. -
FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering a container intrusion signal by a microphone, which enables CSD to record noise caused by container breaking tools, and to determine possible type of tool. - The
microphone 310P is queued in sessions in 2 second intervals. This saves CSD power while avoiding the danger of missing the noise of tools' operation. Measurement session T lasts 0.2 seconds as shown inStep 1201. At the first level of examination, amplitude of microphone signal is verified across the entire frequency band. If input signal Ainp is below preset threshold Amin as shown inStep 1202, subsequent signal processing is skipped until next measurement cycle as shown inStep 1201. Otherwise, power of received signal -
- is evaluated. If signal power exceeds preset threshold PA>Pmin judgment is drawn about presence of noise correspondent to breaking in the container as shown in
Step 1203. Second level of processing takes place then, which includes spectrum analysis of signal power in order to determine the type of tool used to break in the container as show inStep 1205. In this connection, bands exhibiting signal amplitude above preset threshold Ainp f>Amin f are gated out across the entire frequency range. Spectrum power of sound -
- is calculated for gated bandwidth LIE. Through signal processing, a spectrum power array at different frequency bands S is generated. Each container-breaking tool is characterized by its own array of sound spectrum power Si*, limited from below. Tool of breaking is determined in comparing arrays S and Si*. If arrays S included in an array of sound spectrum power Si as shown in
Step 1205, then breaking took place and tool of breaking is recognized as shown inStep 1207. However, if arrays S is not included in an array of sound spectrum power Si as shown inStep 1205, then breaking took place but tool of breaking is unknown as shown inStep 1206. -
FIG. 13 illustrates a flowchart of method of detecting and registering a container intrusion signal based on UMPR. UMPR enables to construct a unique digital imprint of container interior, representing arrangement of items within radar coverage. The imprint would change reflecting changes in arrangement of interior items. - In order to obtain the imprint, the
UMPR 310J emits 2 ms-long pulses in ultrasonic frequency, such as 40 kHz as shown inStep 1301. Meanwhile, theUMPR 310J receiver stays idle. Emitted signal reflects repeatedly from container interior items and then returns to theUMPR 310J, where it is received by ultrasonic receiver. Receiver goes online for 50 ms after the pulse has been sent as shown inStep 1302. Changes in amplitude of received signal for this period are the imprint of container interior. - In order to compare obtained imprint against reference one (which was obtained at the beginning of the trip and store in the pulling library of images 425), UMPR receiver signal is sampled with at least double frequency of emitted signal. Obtained set of N values Y<N>, is compared against reference imprint X<N> using correlation functions as shown in
Step 1303. For example, a function could be used based on supposition that actual imprint could be represented on the reference basis using correlation factors A and B and expressed as Yi=AXi+B. Correlation factors are derived from the system of equations -
- Value of correlation function formulated using least-squares method
-
- is compared against the limit FMAX, and if the limit is exceeded as shown in
Step 1304, a judgment is drawn about changes in container interior as shown inStep 1305. - The
accelerometers 310C, as shown inFIG. 3 , are included withinCSD 140 and are used to create a Digital Signature (DS) and may be used to identify location of cargo within the container.FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters that may be used to form this DS. InFIG. 14 , the following parameters characterizing a spatial distribution of thecontainer 130, where M is the mass of the cargo, Rm represents the coordinates of the center of mass within the body frame, which is strictly connected with the container itself, Ix, Iy, Iz are components of the container moment of inertia, which characterize the mass distribution with respect to the center of mass. - DS is thus defined by these parameters set which may define the expected motion of the container. Changes in one or more of these measured parameters may, therefore, correspond to certain events during cargo transportation. For example, if DS has not changed, the cargo is intact. If, M and Ix, Iy, Iz are the same but Rm has changed, the cargo may not be stolen or damaged, but may have moved within the container 130 (i.e., the coordinates of the center of mass Rm change as the cargo moves within the container). It may, therefore, be necessary to check fastenings of the cargo within the container. If, for example, parameter M does not change, but parameters Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm have changed, it is probably that the cargo has not been stolen (it can be precisely determined based on the degree of the parameters change). However, it is also possible that a partial destruction of the cargo took place (e.g., damage resulting from inaccurate unloading). Change of the moment of inertia with respect to the center of mass may occur due to this destruction. If all parameters of the DS have changed, it is likely that the container has been tampered with. The determination of DS allows not only to reveal theft without opening the container, but may also provide continual monitoring of the cargo's condition.
- The
accelerometers 310C, as shown inFIG. 3 , that are included within theCSD 140, form a Mass-tomograph 1500, as shown inFIG. 15 . The plurality of accelerometers that form the Mass-tomograph are coupled to walls of thecontainer 130. The Mass-tomograph 1500 is used to construct a spatial picture of mass distribution within thecontainer 130. In particular,FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1500 in accordance with one embodiment. Mass-tomograph 1500 may, for example, be used to subtract effects of the surroundings on the accelerometers measurements. The initial calibration of accelerometers may occur without any cargo in the container. A second round of measurements may occur when an object or a cargo (e.g., cargo 1510) is placed inside thecontainer 130. The calibration measurements of the accelerometers are subtracted from the second round of measurements to eliminate influence of the container itself, and the accelerometer measurements are thus only determined for theobject 1510 mass. -
FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1600 that is external tocontainer 130 and when thecontainer 130 is in steady position. In this embodiment, the Mass-tomograph is used as a device to obtain imaging of the contents of the container. In this example, the mass-tomograph 1600 monitors thewhole container 130. When thecontainer 130 is in the steady position the quality of the spatial mass distribution of the container mass depends on two parameters: the accuracy of accelerometers and the distance, laccel 1620, betweenadjacent accelerometers 310C that form the Mass-tomograph 1600. -
FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph 1700 when thecontainer 130 is moving. Mass-tomograph 1700 may, for example represent mass-tomograph 1600,FIG. 16 . In this example, the mass-tomograph 1700 scans thecontainer 130, as thecontainer 130 moves gradually through the Mass-tomograph 1700; in this example thecontainer 130 moves with asteady speed Vcont 1720. In this example, a high quality spatial mass distribution inside thecontainer 130 may be determined, since the quality of spatial mass distribution depends only on the accuracy of accelerometers; the perceived distance laccel 1620 between adjacent accelerometers will be minimal due to the movement of the container. - When the
CSD 140 determines an overall container alert signal based on the decision of the integratedsensor processing procedure 470, shown inFIG. 4 , themicrocontroller 330 activates one or more local alert mechanisms (e.g.,sound devices 320A and/orlight device 320B, as shown inFIG. 3 ) that generate a local alarm signal. Themicrocontroller 330 may also activatetransceivers 350A-350C to transmit a message that includes this alert viaantennas 360B-360D to theBridge 150 and/or theNOC 170. Themicrocontroller 330 also determines time intervals used to activate thetransceivers 350A-350C during communication with theBridge 150 or theNOC 170. In one example, these time intervals may be determined by theNOC 170. - The
CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of thecontainer 130 by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue. - The
CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of thecontainer 130 by Rare Earth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue. - The
power unit 370 of theCSD 140, as shown inFIG. 3 , may include one ormore storage batteries 370A. Thepower unit 370 may also be configured to receive electrical power from a power source of the cargo transport vehicle. In this case, if the power source is interrupted, thepower unit 370 may revert to use of thestorage batteries 370A and/or solar power, for example. In the event of a power interruption or if the storage battery charge falls below a threshold level, theCSD 140 may transmit, viaantennas 360, a power interrupt alarm to theBridge 150 and/or theNOC 170. - The
microcontroller 330 may also implement power-management techniques to reduce power consumption. For example, one or more time window(s) may be specified, during initialization process or viatransceivers 350A-350C, to define activation times for one or more components ofCSD 140. When not operating, (i.e., when outside the specified time windows, theCSD 140 may switch into a sleep (suspend) mode to avoid unnecessary power utilization. In fact, sleep mode may account for a significant part of the life of theCSD 140; theCSD 140 may operate over several years without need of storage battery replacement. In one example of operation, theCSD 140 remains awake (i.e., does not switch to sleep mode) when communicating with theBridge 150 and/or theNOC 170. If theCSD 140 does not receive a signal from theBridge 150 or theNOC 170, theCSD 140 will only stay awake as long as necessary to insure that no signal is present during a time windows specified. TheCSD 140 may also switch from sleep to awake mode if any one anti-tamper sensor ofblock 310 exceeds a certain threshold level. -
FIG. 18 shows a block diagram illustrating oneexemplary Bridge 1800.Bridge 1800 may, for example, representbridge 150 ofFIG. 1 . TheBridge 1800 includes aMicrocontroller unit 1810,GPS receiver 1830,Cellular Modem 1840A, Satellite Modem 184013,WLAN Interface 1840C,ethernet interface 1850A,User interface 1850B,External connection interface 1850C,Antennas Block 1860 andPower Unit 1870. The block ofAntennas 1860 includesGPS antenna 1860A,Cellular antenna 1860B,Satellite antenna 1860C, and International Frequency Band LocalArea Communication antenna 1860D. TheCellular modem 1840A is utilized to communicate with theNOC 170 viacellular communication channel 160A, for example. TheSatellite modem 1840B is utilized to communicate with theNOC 170 viasatellite communication channel 160B, for example. TheWLAN interface 1840C is utilized to communicate with theCSD 140 viaLAN 160C. TheCSD 140 communicates to theNOC 170 via theBridge 1800. Communication from theCSD 140 to theNOC 170 is less costly when theBridge 1800 is utilized to relay the communication. In one example, it saves energy compare to when the CSD communicates with theNOC 170 directly via cellular or satellite communications channels. In one example, theCSD 140 transmits the system status, including any alert status, to theBridge 1800 upon request of theNOC 170. - The Bridge's 1800 includes a
power unit 1870 which may receive power from apower network 1870B. In the event that thispower network 1870B is interrupted,power unit 1870 may be configured to switch over to utilizeStorage batteries 1870A. This power interruption may be detected by themicrocontroller unit 1810, for example, which may transmit an alarm message to theNOC 170. The alarm message may, for example, identify thebridge 1800 by an identification code, the location of the ship provided by theGPS receiver 1830, the date and time of the alarm, and further description of the alarm event (e.g., loss of ship's power). -
FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of oneexemplary Stationary Bridge 1900 according to one embodiment. TheStationary Bridge 1900 may be placed in the areas of high container concentration, such as places of consolidation/deconsolidation of containers, ports, terminals, etc.Stationary Bridge 1900 may be used for continuous communication with theNOC 170.Stationary Bridge 1900 includes theWLAN Interface 1910 and theEthernet interface 1920.Stationary Bridge 1900 may not include a user interface. Further, since the geographical location of theStationary Bridge 1900 remains the same, it may not require a GPS receiver. -
FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of oneexemplary Portative Bridge 2000 according to one embodiment. ThePortative Bridge 2000 may be used where containers are transported, such as on ships, trains, etc. ThePortative Bridge 2000 includes aGPS receiver 2010, aCellular Modem 2020A, aSatellite modem 2020B, aWLAN 2020C, anExternal connection interface 2030 and anAntenna Block 2060. In communicating with theNOC 170, thePortative Bridge 2000 uses cellular 160A andsatellite 160B communication channels. ThePortative Bridge 2000 may not have a user interface. -
FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of oneexemplary Service Bridge 2100 according to one embodiment. TheService Bridge 2100 may be used to support and communicate with one ormore CSDs 140. TheService Bridge 2100 may include acellular modem 2120A, a satellite-modem 2120B, a WLAN 2120C, auser interface 2130A, anExternal connection interface 2130B and anAntenna block 2160. Theservice Bridge 2100 may communicates with theNOC 170 via other Stationary and/or Portative Bridges (e.g., portative bridge 1100) usingUBFT 160C and/or through theCellular 160A and/orsatellite 160B communication channels. -
FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of oneexemplary NOC 2200. TheNOC 2200 may, for example, representNOC 170 ofFIG. 1 . TheNOC 2200 may include a plurality ofterminals 2210 andservers 2220 interconnected viaInternet 2250. Theservers 2220 may include aData Base 2230. Thedata base 2230 may, for example, be used to store sensor data and may contained archives of container events received from one ormore CSDs 140. Thedata base 2230 may also store information pertaining to the location and condition of cargo containers. TheNOC 170 may use the services of a Commercial world wide digitalcellular communication operator 2260A, configured to communicate with theCSD 140 and/or theBridge 150 via thecellular communication channels 160A. TheNOC 170 may also use the service of a Commercial world wide satellitedigital communication operator 2260B that configured to communicate with theCSD 140 and/or theBridge 150 viasatellite communication channels 160B. -
FIG. 23 illustrates a more detailed diagram of thesystem server 2220 and its interaction with other system elements. The server is comprised of a software complex and thedatabase 2230. Generally, server includes following software: database, program for communication withCSD 2380, programs for communication withoperator terminals 2350, and program for analysis ofCSD sensor data 2370. - The
database 2230 contains identification and custom data of secured objects, their condition, CSD operation parameters and commands issued to security modules by system operators. The database can also include data from CSD sensors for its further detailed examination by server means. - The
CSD communication program 2380 receives CSD data during communication session established directly or via bridge, moves the data to server database, extracts operator commands and required service data from the database and sends them to modules. - The operator
terminal communication program 2350 could be used for data exchange with custom terminal programs installed on user computers, or for development of web interface accessible by any authorized user from any computer without dedicated software installed. Accordingly, there can be two types of operator terminals: computer with terminal application installed 2310 and/or computer with aweb browser 2330. The computer with terminal application installed 2310 has the advantage of quick data exchange. The computer withweb browser 2330 provides easy access to the system. Both applications handle operator commands issuing to CSD, their saving in the database and transfer of information about secured objects from database to operator terminals. - The CSD sensor
data analysis program 2370 is used when CSD software is incapable to process sensor data to the level sufficient for deciding on condition of secured object due to its limited computing performance. The CSD sensor data analysis program extracts CSD sensor data from the database, processes it and concludes about the condition of CSD and secured object. Calculation results are stored inserver database 2230. -
FIG. 24 shows a flowchart illustrating oneexemplary method 2399 for monitoring container integrity in accordance with one embodiment. When production of theCSD 140 takes place, theCSD 140 gets initiated instep 2400. Theinitiation step 2400 includes a data packet that is downloaded into CSD's 140microcontroller 330. The data packet includes certain parameters that remain unchanged during the lifetime of theCSD 140. These parameters include an identification code for theCSD 140, an address of a server that may be used to communicate with the CSD, and associated parameters of communication, etc. The initiation of theCSD 140 may, for example, be done by theBridge 150 or other equipment (not shown). - The operation of the
CSD 140 is cyclic. Each CSD cycle lasts one container trip/route (i.e., from the moment of uploading to before the unloading of the container 130). At the route start, theCSD 140 is activated by theBridge 150 or theNOC 170. During the CSD activation, inStep 2402, the CSD'smicrocontroller 330 is cleared of any previously stored information. New information pertaining to the container's route and movement schedule, as well as parameters and logic that use regimes pertaining to the container's 130 safety, are downloaded into themicrocontroller 330. The CSD is placed in the active mode, inStep 2402, by theBridge 150 or by theserver 2220 of theNOC 170. - During the container's route, condition of the
container 130 and its cargo are continually or periodically monitored. During the container's 130 route theCSD microcontroller 330 checks for an alert status from the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 inStep 2404. Then, inStep 2406, themicrocontroller 330 checks if it is a time for the packet of the information pertaining to the container's condition to be sent to theNOC 170. Then inStep 2408 themicrocontroller 330 also checks if the request for communication with theNOC 170 was received from theBridge 150. If theNOC 170 receives a message containing an alert status from theCSD 140, theNOC 170 sends a request to the CSD's 140GPS receiver 340. In response to this request, the GPS receiver determines the geographical location of theCSD 140 inStep 2410, and sends this location information to themicrocontroller 330. - The
CSD 140 may also determine its geographical location by requesting location information from thebridge 150. Themicrocontroller 330 may also periodically request location information from either theGPS receiver 340 or thebridge 150. When the microcontroller sends the request to the GPS receiver inStep 2420, theGPS receiver 340 determines the geographical position of thecontainer 130 inStep 2422. - In
Step 2412 theCSD 140 establishes connection to theNOC 170. TheCSD 140 communicates with theNOC 170 through theBridge 150 using Unlicensed International Frequency Band LocalArea Communication Network 160C. However, if theCSD 140 unable to communicate with theNOC 170 through theBridge 150, TheCSD 140 may communicate with theNOC 170 viacellular communications channels 160A orsatellite communications channels 160B. The CSD's communication via theBridge 150 may be less expensive and may also save energy, as compared to contacting theNOC 170 directly via cellular 160A orsatellite 160B communication channels. - During communication, in
step 2412, between theCSD 140 and theNOC 170, theCSD 140 sends the information packet to theNOC 170. This packet may include one or more of the transmission time, the channel of communication, level of batteries charge, location of the CSD etc. In response to this information theNOC 170 requests that theCSD 140 perform certain commands, inStep 2414, pertaining to further operation of theCSD 140, including a regime for monitoring containers safety, etc. I one example, theCSD 140 may receive a command from theNOC 170 to deactivate theCSD 140. Instep 2416 the CSD verifies that the received command is a deactivation command and, if it is, the CSD deactivates inStep 2418; otherwise Steps 2404-2416 are performed continually until a deactivation command is received. In one example, theCSD 140 may deactivate at route completion before the cargo is unloaded. During this deactivation period, theCSD 140 ceases to monitor containers and cargo safety. - Proposed system could be employed not only for providing security to general ISO containers, but also for ensuring safety of other moving objects, such as vehicles, boats, etc., as well as of remote fixed objects, e.g. country houses. The difference in these cases is the mobile module at secured object.
-
FIG. 25 illustrates the diagram of one potential system application—a personal conditions monitoring system 2500. The system could be employed for monitoring health conditions and accumulated workload of physically weakened persons, those in need for constant medical supervision, as well as specialists directly engaged in potentially dangerous activities. Examples include military and special services personnel, professional drivers, athletes, alpinis6, etc. Generally, security module could be used for monitoring personal conditions, accumulated physical load, for recording events occurred to the person (falling, impacts, changes of position of the body, traveling in transport, etc.), as well as for recording events in the immediate vicinity of the person (gunshots, explosions, changes of temperature and humidity, etc.). - Monitoring module, for example could be the
CSD 140, which includes: thesensor array 310 andADC 320, computing subsystem comprised of themicrocontroller 330 and memory unit, communication subsystem including the transceiver 350 and theantenna 360, and power subsystem withreplaceable batteries 370. The combination of sensors is determined by the purpose of the module. For most applications, theaccelerometers 310C could be used as they enable to monitor position and movement of a person, his pulse and a number of events in the surroundings, and electrodes for measuring amplitude-time parameters of heart biopotentials (ECG) and electrical impedance of the body to automatically estimate functional state of cardiovascular system on the basis of data obtained in examination of electrical activity of the heart, type of vegetative regulation of the rhythm and central gemodynamic parameters obtained in automatic syndromal ECG diagnostics, heart rate variability analysis and impedancegram analysis of the body. - In its operation, monitoring module continuously monitors sensor indications, performs initial processing of measured values, concludes about the condition of the person or events occurred to him, and sends data to the
server 2220. Data is sent to server if personal conditions have changed or when certain emergency events occur, and periodically, e.g. hourly. Data is transferred over a wireless Wi-Fi basedlink 160C or usingcellular networks 160B. Theserver 2220 receives information from themonitoring module 140, performs its additional processing if necessary, and stores it in thedatabase 2230. In emergency cases, server sends SMS notification to phone numbers specified for the person. Terminal program displays all data on the terminal 2310 available at the server in real-time, notifying operator in emergency if necessary. - It should be noted that the matter contained in the above description or shown in the accompanying drawings should be interpreted as illustrative and not in a limited sense. The following claims are intended to cover all generic and specific features described herein, as well as all statements of the scope of the present method and system, which, as a matter of language, might be said to fall there between.
Claims (1)
1. A security system for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle, the system comprising:
a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container wall thereby utilized for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection of intrusion violations accompanied with partial destruction of the container wall when in a coupled condition, the CSD including at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device;
wherein the microcontroller generates an alert status based on an output data generated by least one anti-tamper sensor being subjected to an individual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing procedure, the integrated sensor processing procedure makes determination of the overall container alert status based on the output data from said at least one sensor; and
a Network Operations Center (NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility configured to communicate with at least one telecommunication network, the NOC being configured to receive data from each of a plurality of the CSDs and including a data storage medium configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the container events.
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US8164458B2 (en) | 2012-04-24 |
US20060181413A1 (en) | 2006-08-17 |
US7990270B2 (en) | 2011-08-02 |
US20120025987A1 (en) | 2012-02-02 |
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